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RATIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
STEPHEN J. MORSE*
An agent’s responsibility for action has critical importance in both
criminal and civil law.  In a liberal society that favors negative liberty, the
law permits maximum liberty and autonomy only to responsible agents.1
Generally unencumbered by legal regulation, they are free, for example, to
make foolish, irrational and even dangerous life choices, such as refusing
potentially life-saving medical treatments.  Even if it is virtually certain
that a responsible agent will harm others by, say, criminal behavior or
behavior that might impoverish his or her family, the law cannot intervene
unless the behavior qualifies as a criminal offense.  In contrast, agents who
are not responsible may be treated paternalistically for their own good or
preventively deprived of liberty in the absence of criminal conduct for the
safety of others.
I have pursued questions of responsibility in criminal law and mental
health law since the beginning of my legal academic career at the
University of Southern California Law School.2  This article will canvass
and reflect upon my most recent positions about the central issues of
* Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School and
Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine;
member of the University of Southern California Law School faculty, 1974–1988.  I dedicate this article
to my USC colleagues who taught me so much about legal scholarship.
1. I recognize that there is no clear line between negative and positive liberty, but it is generally
true that our polity favors the right to be left alone over the right to the provision of conditions that
might increase autonomy and other goods.
2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978); Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1985); Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the
Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971 (1982); A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1982); The Twilight of Welfare
Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976); Undiminished Confusion in
Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984); Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1485 (1984) (reviewing NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982)).
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responsibility and desert.3  Part I presents an internal, positive account of
the concept of responsibility that best explains our present criminal and
mental health law rules, practices, and institutions.  I argue that the general
capacity for rationality is the fundamental criterion of responsibility.  Part
II turns to determinism’s challenge to responsibility, which many believe to
be the most profound external critique.  I claim that determinism is not
inconsistent with real responsibility.  Part III applies the rationality model
of responsibility to a number of doctrines and policies in criminal and
mental health law.  Part IV is a brief conclusion.
I.  RESPONSIBILITY
The legal concept of responsibility is primarily moral and political.
Human beings, other animals, and the physical forces of the universe can
all be causally responsible for changes in the world, but only human beings
are capable of being judged morally responsible by a legal regime.
Judgments concerning responsibility are judgments about people, so a
proper understanding of responsibility must begin with a concept of the
person.
In brief, the law’s concept of the person is a creature who acts for
reasons and is potentially able to be guided by reason.  Physical causes
explain all the moving parts of the universe, but only human action can also
be explained by reasons.  It makes no sense to ask the winds or the tides or
infrahuman species why they do what they do, but this question makes
sense of and is central to our explanations of human behavior.  When we
want to know why an agent intentionally behaved as she did, we do not
desire a biophysical explanation, as if the person were simply biophysical
flotsam and jetsam.  Instead, we seek the reason she acted, the desires and
beliefs that formed the practical syllogism that produced intentional
conduct.  There are those who believe that all mental states, such as desires,
beliefs and intentions, can be reduced to biophysical states of the brain and
3. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527 (1996); Crazy Reasons, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189 (1999); Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587 (1994);
Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 114 (William C. Heffernan &
John Kleinig eds., 2000); Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, in
23 CRIME AND JUSTICE 329 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998); Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Respon-
sibility, 19 L. & PHIL. 3 (2000); Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265 (1999); Waiting for
Determinism to Happen (1999), at http://www.legalessays.com/morse.pdf.  The present article draws
liberally from sections of some of the articles listed in this footnote.
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nervous system, but such reductionism is almost certainly “moonshine”4
and the law clearly views human action as reason-governed.
The law’s conception of the person as a practical reasoner is inevitable
if one considers the nature of law.  At base, law is a system of rules and
standards expressed in language that are meant to guide human behavior.
The law therefore presupposes that people are capable of using rules and
standards as premises in the practical syllogisms that guide action.  For
example, no instinct governs how contracts are made or what is the
standard of care in ordinary behavior.  It is plausible, therefore, to assume
that the law plays a guiding, and often the central, role in those areas of
human life that it regulates.
The law’s concept of responsibility follows from its view of the
person and the nature of law itself.  Unless human beings are rational
creatures who can understand the applicable rules and standards, and can
conform to those legal requirements through intentional action, the law
would be powerless to affect human behavior.  Legally responsible agents
are therefore people who have the general capacity to grasp and be guided
by good reason in particular legal contexts.  They must be capable of
rational practical reasoning.  The law presumes that adults are so capable
and that the same rules may be applied to all people with this capacity.  The
law does not presume that all people act for good reason all the time.  It is
sufficient for responsibility that the agent has the general capacity for
rationality, even if the capacity is not exercised on a particular occasion.
Indeed, it is my claim that lack of the general capacity for rationality
explains precisely those cases, such as infancy or certain instances of
severe mental disorder or dementia, in which the law now excuses agents
or finds them not competent to perform some task.
The general capacity for rationality in a particular context is thus the
primary criterion of responsibility and its absence is the primary excusing
condition.5  A general capacity is nothing more than an underlying ability
to engage in certain behavior.6  English speakers, for example, have the
general capacity to speak English, even when they are silent or are
speaking a different language.  Of course, general capacity can refer to
4. Galen Strawson, Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism, 32
INQUIRY 3, 3 (1989).
5. I am assuming, as most theorists about rationality and competence do, that rarely is an
incapacity global across all behavioral domains.  An agent might be quite capable of rationality
generally, but still lack the general capacity in a particular context.  Only in the latter would the
question of responsibility arise.
6. See R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 214–21 (1994).
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behavior that is on a continuum.  For example, a person of average strength
might easily be able to lift a certain amount of weight, but as the weight
increases, it will become harder for the person to lift it and would finally
become impossible.  As long as the agent is generally capable of certain
conduct, it is fair to hold her responsible for failing to engage in such
conduct unless there is a reason that she ought to be excused.  For example,
suppose an object fell on and pinned down a victim that the agent had a
duty to aid.  If the object were light, the average agent might have no
difficulty removing it; if it were heavy, removing it would be more
difficult, but morality and the law alike would expect the agent to strain to
do so and would blame an agent who did not exercise a capacity she
possessed.  People often engage in legally relevant behavior for non-
rational, irrational, and foolish reasons, but this does not excuse them or
render them nonresponsible if they are generally capable of rationality.7
I have claimed that rationality is the defining criterion of legal (and
moral) responsibility, but it is not self-defining.  It is a normative concept
that can take on various meanings according to differing moral and political
judgments about how society should govern itself.  Accepting rationality as
the defining criterion therefore does not entail a commitment to any
particular view of what rationality requires.  “Thick” and “thin” versions
are possible, which would narrow or expand respectively the numbers of
citizens who would be considered responsible.  For example, if rationality
is deemed to require the emotional capacity to empathize with the feelings
of others, then people who lack this capacity, such as psychopaths, would
not be considered rational.  Which capacities and how much of such
capacities are necessary can only be decided on normative grounds.
7. There are objections to the notion of a general capacity.  Some might contend that it is
impossible for an agent to exercise a general capacity on a specific occasion when the agent did not
exercise it.  Such an argument is simply a form of the reductio that no one is capable of doing anything
other than what they did do.  This is trivially true in the sense that agents cannot do “p” and “not-p” at
the same time.  It does not follow, however, that it is impossible for an agent to exercise the general
capacity.  An English speaker who is silent surely has the general capacity to speak English.
A more challenging version of the same claim is the determinist argument, which suggests that
the notion of a general capacity is useless because at a fixed time only one outcome is ever possible for
both an agent and the other moving parts of the universe, given antecedent events and the fixed laws of
the physical world.  Such an argument is an external, metaphysical attack on the basic concepts and
practices of responsibility.  I return to it more generally in Part II.  Taken seriously, however, it would
suggest that no one should ever be treated as more or less responsible than anyone else because either
no one or everyone is responsible.  Thus, this argument cannot possibly explain or furnish internal
grounds for criticism of current concepts and practices.  The notion of a general capacity is one we use
all the time to evaluate our behavior and that of others.  There is no reason to abandon it in the face of
an unknowable metaphysical challenge.
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Although there cannot be an a priori, incontrovertible answer to such
normative questions, some guidance is available concerning the content of
the capacity for rationality.  I do not have an exalted or complicated notion
of rationality—itself a congeries of skills rather than a unitary capacity.  At
the very least, rationality must include the ability, in Susan Wolf’s words,
“to be sensitive and responsive to relevant changes in one’s situation and
environment—that is, to be flexible.”8  By this account, rationality is the
ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, to form justifiable
beliefs, and to reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts
appropriately and according to a minimally coherent preference-ordering.
Rationality includes the general ability to recognize and be responsive to
the good reasons that should guide action.9  Put yet another way, it is the
ability to act for good reasons.  There is good reason not to act (or to act) if
doing so (or not doing so) will be unjustifiably harmful or maladaptive.
A highly controversial question is whether desires or preferences in
themselves can be irrational.10  It is of course true that having desires most
people consider irrational is likely to get one into trouble, especially if the
desires are strong and frequently occurring.  Nonetheless, I conclude that
even if certain desires can be labeled irrational, irrational desires do not
deprive the agent of normative competence unless they somehow disable
the rational capacities just addressed or produce an internal hard-choice
situation distinguishable from the choices experienced by people with
equally strong, rational desires.  In other words, if the agent with irrational
desires can comprehend the relevant features of her conduct, she can be
held responsible if her irrational desires are the reasons she engages in
legally relevant behavior.
Rationality is of course a continuum concept and individuals differ
widely in their ability to get the facts straight, to understand the rules, and
to reason.  People with fewer endowments will find it harder to be rational;
people with more will find it easier.  In general, however, the threshold for
responsibility or competence in law is not high because our legal system
has a preference for maximizing liberty and autonomy.  Minimal rationality
will usually suffice and unimpaired adults will have the general capacity in
most contexts to meet the law’s relatively modest requirements.
8. SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 69 (1990).
9. See JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY
OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 41 (1998).
10. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 139–40 (1993) (“At present, we have no
adequate theory of the substantive rationality of goals and desires . . . .”).
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Because I claim that rationality best explains our doctrines of
responsibility, the concept of rationality must do a great deal of work.  One
might therefore desire a more precise, uncontroversial definition of
irrationality, but such a desire would be unreasonable.  The definition I am
using, which is always open to normative revision, is grounded in our
ordinary, everyday understanding of practical reasoning and its critical role
in human interaction, including morality.  We are, after all, the only
creatures on earth who truly act for reasons.  We all, everywhere and
always, successfully employ the imprecise definition I am using to evaluate
both moral and nonmoral conduct.  To demand more is to desire the
impossible and the unnecessary.  Moreover, if one wishes to jettison
rationality as the core responsibility condition because it is difficult to
define it precisely, the burden should then be on the agent rejecting
rationality to offer and justify a more morally compelling and precise
criterion.
In addition to the general capacity for rationality, the absence of
compulsion, coercion, or involuntariness is also a condition of
responsibility.11  An agent who is compelled to engage in conduct will not
be held responsible for that conduct.  Much confusion exists concerning the
meaning of compulsion.  To begin, compulsion has both a literal and a
metaphorical meaning.  The literal meaning involves cases in which the
agent’s bodily movement is not intentional, but is produced by an external
or internal force that operates as a pure mechanism.  For example, an
agent’s arm might rise despite the agent’s intention to keep it still because a
much stronger person forces the agent’s arm up or because the agent
suffers from an untreatable neurological disorder that produces an upward
jerk of the arm.  In both cases, the movement is literally, mechanistically
compelled and not intentional.  Indeed, in such cases we say that the agent
has not acted at all and because agents can only be legally responsible for
action, these are indisputably cases in which the agent is not responsible.12
The metaphorical cases are more problematic.  In these cases, the
agent is placed in a “do it or else” hard-choice situation.  If the agent acts to
avoid the threatened “or else”  by doing “it” and then seeks to be excused
for “it,” the question is when the threat or hard choice is sufficiently hard to
qualify as compulsion.  Notice that the agent’s action is surely intentional
11. These terms are often used interchangeably and nothing conceptually turns on the term used.
For ease of exposition, I will use “compulsion” to address the issues.
12. In criminal law, assuming that the agent did not intentionally create the situation in which the
mechanism would operate on her, such claims defeat the prima facie case because there has not been a
“voluntary act.”
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and apparently rational.  There is no “volitional” problem because the agent
is perfectly able to execute the action necessary to avoid the threat.13
Acting to avoid a harmful outcome is rational, understandable conduct, but
which threats should excuse?  Should the standard be subjective, based on
the agent’s subjective fear of or distaste for the threatened outcome, or
should it be objective, based on whether we think a reasonable person
should have been expected to resist the threat.  The choice between the two
standards and the content of the standards—How much fear? What is
reasonable?—are both normative issues.  In general, the law has opted for
objective standards, with the standard of reasonableness varying according
to the interests at stake in a particular context.  For example, the criminal
law defense of duress only obtains if the defendant is threatened with death
or grievous bodily injury (common law)14 or if a person of reasonable
firmness would have yielded to a threat of unlawful force (Model Penal
Code).15
The issue of compulsion is further vexed by “one-party” cases in
which the agent is allegedly compelled by desires produced by mental
disorder or other untoward internal states.  Familiar examples include drug
seeking and using by addicts, sexual molestation by pedophiles, and betting
by compulsive gamblers.  Control, volitional, or irresistible impulse
insanity defense tests are doctrinal responses to such alleged compulsions.
Because the compulsion is caused by allegedly abnormal internal states
there is a natural tendency to think of these cases as mechanistic, like the
arm jerk of an agent with a neurological disorder, but this is an incorrect
view.  In all these cases, the agent is acting intentionally, apparently driven
by strong, insistent desires.  The agent wants to avoid the discomfort of
abstinence, to obtain the pleasure of indulgence, or both, but in all cases the
agent acts intentionally to satisfy the desire. Once again, there is no
volitional problem, properly understood, because the agent is able to
execute the action to satisfy the desire.  If one conceives of the discomfort
of abstinence as a threat, however, the analogy to external compulsion
arises, but when should such threats be sufficient to excuse?
I am firmly of the opinion that disorders of desire should excuse only
in those cases in which the desire is so strong and overwhelming that the
agent at least temporarily loses the capacity to be guided by reason.  Thus,
the problem would be irrationality and not compulsion.  Furthermore, if the
13. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 113–65 (1993) (explaining that a volition is
simply a species of executory intention that converts an intention into an action).
14. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 273 (2d ed. 1995).
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962).
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agent experienced quiescent periods in which the desire was not
demanding, as all agents in fact do, she might have the duty to take steps to
avoid future situations in which she might do harm because she would
become irrational.  In sum, external compulsion is relatively rare but
furnishes an excuse; intense desires are perhaps less rare, but only furnish
an excuse if they produce irrationality.  Finally, action in response to
delusional beliefs, say the paranoid belief that one is about to be killed,
producing self-defensive behavior, is no more compelled than if such
beliefs are reasonably or unreasonably mistaken.  The delusional mistake
would excuse because it is irrational, not because the delusional actor is
more compelled than rational actors with the same belief.
Finally, some would argue that free will, free choice or the like are the
criteria for responsibility.  Most of these locutions are confusing,
conclusory, prove too much, or are placeholders for a full, robust theory of
responsibility.16  We would do well to abandon all such locutions as
explanations of responsibility within legal discourse.  If they are unpacked,
all collapse into a theory about rationality and hard choice.
In sum, the general capacity for rationality is the precondition for
liberty and autonomy.  A lack of this capacity explains virtually all cases of
criminal law excuses and virtually all the mental health laws that treat some
people with mental disorders differently from people without disorders.
II.  THE CHALLENGE OF DETERMINISM
Determinism is famously thought to be the most threatening challenge
to ordinary moral and legal notions of responsibility: How can it be fair to
say that anyone deserves praise and blame, reward and punishment, if it is
true, roughly, that all events in the universe, including human behavior, are
fully caused and explained by the conjunction of prior events and the
covering physical laws of the universe?  On this view, it may seem that
human beings are simply passive spectators of the events that are their
lives, rather than active agents whose actions determine the shape of those
lives.  No one knows if any of the various theses called determinism are
true because it is impossible to know with certainty unless someone were
somehow able to step outside the universe and to look in.  Nonetheless, the
universe appears to be such a lawful, regular place that we must accept the
“realism constraint” that determinism, universal lawful causation or a near
approximation is an accurate metaphysical view, at least at levels above the
16. See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 3, at 1590–1605 (examining the flaws in
these alternative accounts).
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subatomic.17  Consequently, our physical and interpersonal lives are
properly predicated on the deep, rarely consciously acknowledged
assumptions that matter does not rearrange itself at random and that our
social and interpersonal lives depend on an enormous amount of implicit
and explicit understanding of the regularities of nature, including human
conduct.
There are three standard responses to deterministic worries.  First,
determinism is true and responsibility is impossible (so-called hard
determinism, a form of incompatibilism); second, if determinism were true,
responsibility would be impossible, but it is not true, at least not for human
adults, and responsibility is possible (so-called metaphysical libertarianism,
also a form of incompatibilism); third, determinism is true, yet
responsibility is possible (so-called soft determinism or compatibilism).
Anxieties about the relation between determinism and responsibility will
not and should not vanish, but I conclude nonetheless that the compatibilist
view is internally consistent, coherent, and provides the best theoretical and
practical hope for grounding responsibility in both morality and law.
The hard determinist viewpoint generates an external, rather than an
internal, critique of responsibility.  That is, hard determinism does not try
either to explain or to justify our responsibility concepts and practices.  It
simply assumes that they are metaphysically unjustified, even if they are
internally coherent and justifiable according to some equally unjustifiable
moral or political concept.  To see why determinism cannot explain our
responsibility attributions, remember that determinism “goes all the way
down”: it applies to all people, all events.  If this is a causal universe, all
events are caused; no one and nothing is outside the causal stream.  Thus, if
determinism is true and is genuinely inconsistent with responsibility, then
no one can ever be truly responsible for anything and responsibility cannot
provide a justification for further action.  But western theories of morality
and the law do hold some people responsible and excuse others, and when
we do excuse, it is not because there has been a little local determinism at
work.  For example, we do not hold young children fully responsible
because they are not fully rational, not because they are determined
creatures and adults are not.  Determinism and causation do not loosen their
grip on us as we age.
Determinism also does not tell us how we should act or what justice
demands.  Understanding the lawful regularities of human behavior might
reveal what is possible for human beings and what is not, but such
17. Strawson, supra note 4, at 12.
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understanding cannot dictate what morals, politics, and laws we ought to
adopt.  As we know from both history and ordinary observation, people are
capable of adopting and acting on extraordinarily diverse moral, political,
and legal schemes, which can make immense differences in the material
and moral conditions of peoples’ lives.  It is difficult to imagine what the
metaphysical truth of determinism could tell us about how we should live.
To what metaphysical facts should morality and law have to answer?  Even
if there are right answers, without placing ourselves outside the universe—
anyway an impossibility—how would we ever know that we got it right?
Hard determinism is a moral and legal dead end.
Libertarianism has estimable adherents, but in my view even the most
sophisticated version is metaphysically bewildering.  Many people believe
that “real” responsibility is possible only if people genuinely are prime
movers unmoved.  Only then would responsibility be secure because all our
intentions and actions would be entirely “up to us.”  Such god-like powers
would indeed be a secure foundation for responsibility, but it seems wildly
implausible that humans possess them.  It is simply unimaginable that
intentions and actions are not caused by the various genetic and
environmental influences that shape peoples’ lives.  What would one have
to believe, metaphysically, to believe also that those causes somehow apply
to everything but human intentions and actions?  Furthermore, it makes
little sense to suggest that causal processes shape behavior, but with less
force or less fully than the causal processes that shape other events.  If this
is a causal universe, it is causal all the way down.  We would like to be
prime movers unmoved, but we are not.18  Libertarianism, despite its
promise, cannot provide a plausible foundation for responsibility, but we
need not have the power it posits to justify responsibility.
Compatibilism, the view that we can be responsible in a deterministic
universe, is the most theoretically and practically satisfactory response to
deterministic anxieties.  It is also the predominant view among
philosophers.  Attribution of responsibility and related practices are
socially constructed, fundamentally moral enterprises.  As such, they must
be justified primarily by an internal, normative argument.  It is hard to
imagine to what metaphysical facts one could appeal outside morality itself
and our best understanding of human nature.  Nonetheless, anxieties about
determinism and other apparent threats motivate many to seek a secure,
external foundation to ground concepts as important as responsibility.
18. A less sophisticated version of libertarianism claims that there is indeterminacy in the
universe, including in our brains and nervous systems, but this does not help.  Why would essentially
random events in our brains or anywhere else be a basis for responsibility?
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Most notable among the seekers are theologians and secular
metaphysicians, who try to justify responsibility with speculations and
arguments about the divine or about ultimate reason.  I am unconvinced by
these accounts, however, and believe that no ultimate, uncontroversial
justification can be found.  There is simply no way to know about the
existence of God or the genuine ontology of the universe.  What is more
disquieting, if we were convinced that God or metaphysical moral reality
existed, such a conclusion would not lead to uncontroversial concrete
answers to the specific questions of morals, politics, and law that vex
human societies.  Even if we agree that in principle there are ontologically
correct answers to every moral question, there is no way for us to know
what those answers are.  For example, knowing that an absolute morality
exists does not tell us whether the death penalty is ever justified.  On
epistemological grounds alone, then, even if foundations exist, we will
never know when we have reached rock bottom.
We must therefore try to justify our concepts and practices by using
the best moral and political theories available, recognizing that none will
ever cause determinist anxieties to disappear or provide universally
satisfying, uncontroversial, persuasive answers to the hardest problems.
Because I accept the realism constraint, the view that the macro-universe is
lawfully regular, the most I can do is to offer an internal account of
responsibility that is not inconsistent with the truth of determinism or
principles of fairness that we endorse.  Indeed, I believe that the account of
responsibility based on the capacity for rationality that Part I provided does
explain our legal concepts, practices, and institutions.  More normatively
important, accepting the general capacity for rationality as the basis for
responsibility is fully consistent with deeply held principles of justice in
our moral and legal culture.
Individual and collective actions can cause pleasure or pain, can create
wealth or poverty, can be kind or cruel.  We discuss, argue, fight, and even
kill about morals and politics precisely because the moral and political
regime in which we live has an enormous impact on our well-being.  It is
unimaginable that conscious, social creatures such as ourselves could live
in a world without moral and nonmoral norms, without some moral and
political regime.  Even if it is a deterministic world, even if our actions are
determined, we are rational creatures.  We must deliberate about how to
act, and it is clear that those deliberations and actions make a difference.
Only creatures who genuinely do not care about their lives or who believe
that their actions make no difference fail to deliberate about what to do, but
few, if any, people fully fit that description.
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The possibility of predicting future behavior also cannot avoid the
necessity for practical reason.19  Suppose that instead of deliberating an
agent decides simply to conform or to defer to the agent’s own prediction
about what the agent will do.  The agent must then take into account in
making the prediction the agent’s own knowledge of what the agent will
do.  But such knowledge would create an infinite regress problem that
would undermine the agent’s ability to predict her own behavior.  An
agent’s knowledge of the prediction will affect the agent’s behavior, which
in turn will affect the prediction, and so on.  Prediction of one’s own
behavior cannot substitute for practical reason because one cannot predict
one’s own behavior. Others can in principle successfully predict another
agent’s behavior, but once again, only if they do not reveal the prediction to
the agent or if practical reason is ineffectual.  And if the prediction is not
revealed to the agent, the agent cannot conform or defer to the prediction
and must use practical reason to decide what to do.
Even if determinism is true, we cannot wait for it to happen.  We must
determine what determinism dictates.  And we do.
III.  LAW AND POLICY
This Part considers a number of doctrinal and policy issues in criminal
law and mental health law that have consistently concerned me: Should a
history of deprivation furnish an excuse to crime? How should the law
respond to crimes motivated by disorders of desire?  Should psychopathy
provide an excuse?  How should the law respond to newly discovered
psychological syndromes?  Should the criminal law adopt a generic partial-
responsibility excusing condition?  Should results matter to desert?  Is
involuntary civil commitment justified for some people with mental
disorders?  The model of responsibility Part I describes is at the heart of
much of the analysis, but my views are also animated by a strong political
preference for permitting maximum liberty and autonomy.20
Understanding that the capacity for rationality is the fundamental
criterion of criminal responsibility for intentional action clarifies a number
of important criminal law questions.  Let us begin with the oft-stated claim
that a history of deprivation that plays a causal role in criminal conduct
19. See HILARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 79–88 (1998).
20. By necessity, the arguments presented here must be telegraphic and conclusory; the fuller
arguments are found in the articles cited supra note 3.
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should itself be an excusing condition.21  Causation per se is not an
excusing condition, however.  If it were, everyone or no one would be
excused because all behavior is caused.22  Deprivation should provide an
excuse only if it severely diminishes the agent’s capacity for rationality, but
there is little reason to believe that this is true for most people who have
had an unfortunate history of deprivation.  Indeed, to believe otherwise
threatens to patronize and stigmatize such people.  In cases in which
rationality is diminished, the excusing condition should be irrationality, not
deprivation.  Nor is there reason to believe that deprived people are often in
a sufficiently hard-choice condition to justify a compulsion excuse.
Deprivation is not compulsion per se, and if a deprived person is compelled
by a sufficient threat, duress will be the excusing doctrine.  In contrast, if
deprivation produces a situation in which otherwise wrongful conduct is
right or permissible under the circumstances because the balance of evils is
positive, the agent will be justified.  For example, an agent may justifiably
steal to avoid starvation because it is preferable to commit theft than to
starve.  As a matter of social justice, our society must try harder to prevent
avoidable deprivation among needy citizens, but excusing responsible
agents will not accomplish this goal.
How should the law respond to criminal conduct motivated by
“disorders” of desire, such as “addictions,” so-called “pathological” or
“compulsive” gambling, “deviant” sexual desires, and the like?23  I
suggested in Part I that, contrary to popular belief, there is no problem of
compulsion or volition in such cases, but in some cases the desire may be
so intense that it undermines the capacity for rationality.  Nonetheless, an
irrationality excuse is problematic because virtually all sufferers from
disorders of desire have quiescent periods during which their capacity for
rationality is not undermined and during which they recognize future
dangers.  They arguably have the duty at that time to take those steps
necessary to suppress the desire or to ensure that they will not be in a
position to act wrongly or dangerously when they become irrational.  Thus,
they may be held legally responsible if they offend to satisfy the desire.
Some disorders of desire, such as addiction, may sometimes produce a
lifestyle with so much physical and psychological stress that the addict’s
21. I address this issue most recently in Deprivation and Desert, supra note 3.  I first addressed it
in The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, supra note 2.
22. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985); Morse,
Deprivation and Desert, supra note 3, at 130–32.
23. I address this issue most recently in Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility, supra
note 3.  I put many of the categorical terms in scare quotes because all such characterizations inevitably
beg social, moral and empirical questions.
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general capacity for rationality is impaired, even when the desire is not at
its peak.  Such cases should be treated like “settled insanity” and an excuse
like legal insanity should obtain.  Whether many or few addicts would be
excused under such a regime would depend on a normative judgment about
how much the general capacity for rationality must be undermined to
warrant a full excuse.  In cases of lesser impairment, a generic partial
responsibility excuse, discussed below,24 might apply to addicts and others
with disorders of desire.  Finally, if those with such desires are considered
criminally responsible, as they usually are, it is difficult to justify a regime
of preventive civil detention on the ground that such people cannot control
themselves.  I am not sure what it means to be unable to control oneself,
but if this condition warrants preventive detention, it should also furnish an
excuse to crime.25  After all, could it possibly be fair to blame and to
punish those who genuinely cannot control themselves?
Although the law does not furnish an excusing condition to
psychopaths, people who lack a conscience and the capacity for empathy, I
believe that they are morally irrational and should be excused.  Unless an
agent is able to understand what the victim will feel and is able to at least
feel the anticipation of unpleasant guilt for unjustifiably harming another,
the agent lacks the capacity to grasp and be guided by the primary rational
reasons for complying with legal and moral norms.  What could be a better
reason not to harm another than full, emotional understanding of another’s
pain?  People who lack such understanding are, in my opinion, incapable of
moral rationality and not part of our moral community.  They should not be
held responsible, but if they are dangerous, they should be civilly confined
to protect society.26
The alleged discovery of new psychological or psychiatric syndromes,
such as battered-victim syndrome or abused-child syndrome, has motivated
claims for new excusing conditions.27  Once again, however, even if a
syndrome is valid and played a causal role in the criminal conduct,
24. See infra text accompanying notes 28–29.
25. I discuss this issue more fully in Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 250 (1998) and in Neither Desert nor Disease, supra note 3, at 271–79.  In both articles I
criticize the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
(upholding the constitutionality of Kansas’ law authorizing preventive detention of so-called mentally
abnormal sexually violent predators).
26. I leave open the fraught questions of how much predictive ability we now possess and how
much should be required to justify preventive detention.  I consider these issues in Blame and Danger:
An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113 (1996); Fear of Danger, Flight from
Culpability, supra note 25; and Neither Desert nor Disease, supra note 3.
27. I address this issue most fully in Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and
Conceptual Review, supra note 3.
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causation per se is not an excuse.  Thus, the law should not adopt a new
excuse each time a causal variable for crime, such as a syndrome, is
discovered.  The proper way to understand these claims is that many
syndromes may potentially undermine rationality, which is a genuine
excusing condition.  Indeed, in many cases, the defendant’s rationality does
appear diminished, but the insanity defense is unlikely to obtain because
most new syndrome sufferers remain firmly in contact with reality and
more substantial irrationality is usually necessary for a successful plea of
legal insanity.  Consequently, there is no extant excusing doctrine to cover
these cases and mitigation must be considered solely and discretionarily at
sentencing or through executive clemency or pardon.  As I shall argue, this
result is unfair and can be remedied by the adoption of a generic partial
excuse.
Before turning to the partial-responsibility proposal, let me comment
briefly on the attempts by some advocates to use new syndromes to support
alleged justifications, such as self-defense, under conditions in which
traditional self-defense would not obtain.  The argument is that the
reasonable person should be “subjectified,” that is, the law should grant a
justification if the person acted as a “reasonable syndrome sufferer.”  But
this move would obliterate objectivity and the important distinction
between justification and excuse.  It is also internally incoherent.  By
definition, the syndrome sufferer, who has a mental abnormality, is
unreasonable in those areas of his or her life in which the syndrome is
operating.  The impulse to adopt a justification in these cases is
understandable, but it would produce unwise policy and should be resisted.
Contrary to my earlier writing on this subject,28 I now believe that the
law should adopt a generic partial excusing condition, “Guilty But Partially
Responsible,” based on diminished rationality.29  Mitigating doctrines in
the law of homicide, such as provocation and passion, or extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, reflect the recognition that many defendants suffer
from substantially impaired rationality that is nonetheless insufficient to
support an insanity claim.  There is no reason whatsoever that such
impaired rationality is true only of homicide defendants.  Indeed, the
criteria of such doctrines are potentially fully applicable to the mental states
28. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Capacity: A Moral and Legal Conundrum, 2 INT’L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 271 (1979); Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, supra note 2.
29. I deal with this topic more fully, including discussion of the criteria and possible objections,
in Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, supra note 3, at 397–402.
My analysis is influenced by and indebted to a similar proposal made by Herbert Fingarette and Ann
Hasse.  See HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY 199–261 (1979).
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of defendants accused of any crime.  Because rationality is the touchstone
of responsibility and culpability, the law should offer a formal, doctrinal
partial excuse rather than leave mitigation primarily to the discretion of
sentencing judges.  Although responsibility is a continuum concept and an
agent’s level of responsibility depends on facts about the agent’s capacity
for rationality, we have only limited epistemic ability to make the fine-
grained responsibility judgments that are theoretically possible.  Thus, as
the mitigating doctrines within homicide law demonstrate, one generic
partial excuse with a legislatively mandated reduction in sentence would be
a workable scheme that would improve the quality of justice in criminal
cases.  Such a partial excuse would apply and would be a rational, just
response in many cases in which new syndrome claims are made.
Whether results should increase a criminal offender’s moral
responsibility and desert has vexed criminal law scholars for decades.30
The predominant view among criminal law theorists today is that they
should not.  This view is driven by the recognition that two offenders who
commit the same offense with the same mental state seem equally culpable,
whether or not the intended result occurs, but this opinion is challenged by
a substantial minority of scholars, and the law and public opinion are
clearly to the contrary.  The primary rationale for the conclusion that results
should not matter has been based on the libertarian view that our actions
are fully up to us whereas results are a matter of sheer luck.  Although I
agree that results should not matter to desert, the libertarian solution is
unsupportable for the reasons given in Part II.  I believe that the best
explanation is that the law can only guide action ex ante and it clearly
cannot guide states of the world that occur after a wrongdoer has acted.
Responsibility and culpability depend entirely on the capacity to be guided
by reason and therefore results should not matter to desert.  The results a
defendant intentionally risks by conduct are fundamental to responsibility
and desert attributions, but the results themselves are not.
I should like to conclude this part with some brief remarks on
involuntary civil commitment of people with mental disorders.  In 1982, I
published a wide-ranging attack on the theoretical and practical
justification of this practice.31  Much has changed since then.  Treatment
30. I address this issue more fully in The Moral Metaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 879, 881–89 (2000), and am currently working on a more detailed examination, Guiding
Goodness (draft on file with the author).  The argument is directed solely to the retributive justification
for punishment; consequentialism might produce a different result.
31. See A Preference For Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally
Disordered, supra note 2.
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technologies have improved and misguided long-term commitment is now
rare.  The economics of mental health care today are such that hospitals
wish to release people as soon as possible, rather than to keep them for
extended periods.  Virtually all involuntary inpatients suffer from severe
disorders and a very substantial proportion also have problems with
substance abuse or dependence.  Outpatient commitment is increasingly
popular, albeit controversial.  Nonetheless, much remains the same.
Insufficient resources are devoted to the public care of people with severe
and chronic disorders.  Although pharmacotherapy is in most cases a
crucially important part of an adequate treatment regime, it is still
overemphasized and not enough accompanying psychosocial rehabilitation
and community follow-up is provided.
I now believe that involuntary commitment is theoretically justifiable
for those whose general capacity for rationality is so impaired that they are
not capable of making rational decisions about their lives and not capable
of living safely without treatment.  Nonetheless, I continue to believe, as I
did in 1982, that involuntary civil commitment is unwise and should be
abolished because it is consequentially unjustified.  Our society lacks the
resources to adequately treat the many people with severe disorders who
need services and would accept them willingly.  It is bootless to force those
who do not want services to accept them because they have no greater
claim to those services than those who would accept them voluntarily.
Moreover, it is a fantasy to believe that involuntary commitment prevents
large numbers of serious crimes and self-injuries.  Mental disorders alone,
even severe mental disorders, do not render most sufferers more dangerous
than people without mental disorders.  Only if people with disorders have a
substance problem does the rate of violent crime increase substantially, but
even then, the majority of people with co-occurring disorders do not
engage in violent crime.  Our best hope for both efficacious treatment
provision and danger reduction is, as always, to offer adequate services
with respect and caring attitudes to those who need them most without the
threat of legal coercion.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The general capacity for rationality is the fundamental criterion for the
ascription of responsibility that is the foundation for liberty and autonomy.
Determinism or universal causation poses a theoretical threat to
responsibility, but compatibilism provides a satisfactory theoretical answer.
There is no practical alternative to a compatibilist account of responsibility.
Rationality explains and normatively justifies both ascriptions of criminal
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responsibility and civil and criminal law doctrines that treat some people
with mental disorders as nonresponsible.
